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ABSTRACT. Wittgenstein in his later posthumous writings investigates the meanings 
of names as a practical activity of rule-governed language game playing.  Rules for 
language games, as for all games in Wittgenstein’s frequent analogies, are determined 
in turn by the “point” and “purpose” of the games. Wittgenstein also famously main- 
tains that a game could not be invented without being played, or even having been 
played only once, in the absence of a cultural context embedded in a form of life in 
which games and the playing of games is already an established practice. This essay 
examines Wittgenstein’s general concept of the invention of games, their dependence 
on rules as part of his general later remarks concerning the nature of meaning, and 
proposes an interpretation by which it is not only intelligible but inevitable that on 
his approach it should be impossible for a game to be invented that is never played 
or played only once in lieu of a games-playing component to a prevailing form of 
life. The solution to the problem of understanding Wittgenstein on this topic derives 
from a further application of his concept of a criterion of correctness, generally 
thought to belong exclusively to his so-called private language argument.   
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1. Language and Other Games    
 
Wittgenstein in Philosophical Investigations is concerned to understand how 
a given name refers to a particular object. It is a question that Wittgenstein in 
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus explicitly maintains does not need to be 
answered in order to explain the meaning of language. Shortly after return- 
ing to philosophy in 1929, Wittgenstein repudiates the disposable Tractatus 
semantic infrastructure of logical atomism, picture theory of meaning, and 
general form of proposition. He appears to have decided, among a package 
of insights gained from the dismantling of the Tractatus, that, symptoms 
aside, the project’s spectacular failure was fundamentally due to its inability 
to explain the naming of simple objects by simple names at the foundations 
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of the Tractatus analysis of thought, world and language in Wittgenstein’s 
early account of the possibility conditions for expressing determinate meaning 
in a language.   
The first sentence of The Blue Book, compiled from Wittgenstein’s first 
lectures dictated to students at Cambridge University in 1930, accordingly 
asks: “What is the meaning of a word?”1 In sharp contrast, only a decade 
previously, leaning heavily on Bertrand Russell’s theory of definite descrip- 
tions in “On Denoting,” Wittgenstein in the Tractatus had argued that name-
object semantic coordinations were strictly unnecessary in light of the desig- 
nation of specific objects by definite descriptors:  
 
5.526: One can describe the world completely by completely 
generalized propositions, i.e. without from the outset co-ordinating 
any name with a definite object. 
In order then to arrive at the customary way of expression we 
need simply say after an expression ‘there is one and only one x, 
which…:’ and this x is a.2  
 
The starting point for his later masterwork, Philosophical Investigations, is 
predicated on Wittgenstein’s having rejected the three pillars of the Tractatus.  
He nevertheless remains ultimately engaged, as in the early thought, in a bold 
effort at turning philosophy against itself. Philosophical Investigations seeks 
another, radically different and even more revolutionary account of how 
language functions in the expression of thought. Wittgenstein investigates 
the philosophical grammar of terms and expressions extracted from their 
normal usage where they give rise in endlessly complicated ways to gratu- 
itous philosophical problems. Perspicuous representations of the philosophical 
grammar of philosophically problematic language are detailed by the later 
Wittgenstein in the expectation that in another way his new pragmatic ex- 
planation of language will also undermine the traditional concept of philosophy 
as a search for truth in a specific field of genuinely meaningful propositions.   
Wittgenstein replaces metaphysics of logical atomism, the picture theory 
of meaning, and the general form of proposition with a more comprehensive 
understanding of what language does and how it works to express meaning, 
involving the later philosophy’s adaptable apparatus of language games, forms 
of life, family resemblance predications, and rule-following. There are many 
different language games, the later Wittgenstein believes. Language is not 
devoted exclusively to the single Tractatus function of making to ourselves 
true or false propositional pictures that describe existent or nonexistent 
logically contingent states of affairs. Tautology and contradiction are brought 
along for the ride in Tractatus as limiting cases of propositions, even though 
they do not meaningfully picture any of the facts (Tatsachen) by a structure 
of which a world is constituted (4.46–4.463). The early Wittgenstein also allows 
tautology and contradiction by courtesy to be included as propositions under 
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his somewhat unsatisfying technical distinction, senseless (sinnlos), because 
they do not picture facts in the world (4.462), but not nonsensical (unsinnig), 
because they are “part of the symbolism” (4.4611). Anything else falling 
outside the exactly drawn perimeter that is neither a logically contingent true 
or false picture of the constitutive facts of a world, nor a tautology or con- 
tradiction, is not a meaningful use of language in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus.  
Language serves only the interest of descriptive science, although its logic is 
also important for mathematics, while whatever stands outside the exact 
recursion established by the general form of proposition, including things of 
the greatest value or importance in our lives, is nondiscursive, in many in- 
stances concerning things like value and logical, pictorial and representational 
form transcend linguistic expression, implying that our thoughts about them 
are inherently ineffable.3   
The later Wittgenstein in contrast is sensitive to the fact that we can do 
many more kinds of things in language than merely describe a choice of 
logically contingent facts about the world. We can, just to scratch the surface, 
give orders and obey them, he says, tell jokes, speculate about an event, buy 
five red apples at a store, make up and narrate a story, deliver a eulogy, issue 
instructions in an organized activity like building a structure from blocks, 
pillars, beams and slabs (§§2, 11, 23–27).4 Wittgenstein regards such practical 
language-related activities as among the language games our cultures have 
evolved and in some sense invented to serve a diverse family of particular 
pragmatic interests, the rules for which are determined in turn by the “point” 
and “purpose” of each language game’s rules (§§562–567).   
Language games are invented by devising a system of rules, and they are 
played by following the rules (§567). We must follow the rules strategically 
under changing circumstances in order to play a game successfully, including 
simple and complicated language games, in order to win against a compet- 
itor, when that sort of winning is defined by the rules, including the lexical 
and philosophical grammatical rules, or to have some kind of satisfactory 
outcome. Wittgenstein’s specific application of family resemblance predica- 
tions to the example of games alerts us to the fact that we should not expect 
all games to have any single nature. Some games will have a conspicuous 
feature where it exists at all, and other games will not (§§69–71). Com- 
parisons of language games and board games or sports-related games can 
only go so far, and we cannot criticize language games because they do not 
share what may seem at first to be indispensable from the limited perspective 
offered by the particular subdomain of games that we may happen to have in 
mind. Language games like board games have rules, even if not all games 
are rule-governed activities in the sense of having their rules printed on the 
inside of a box cover.   
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The question as to what rules are, in the case of games generally and 
language games in particular, is therefore an indispensable part of Wittgen- 
stein’s post-Tractatus inquiry into the meaning of language. The question 
leads Wittgenstein to the more basic problem of understanding the origin and 
existence conditions of rule-governed games, and hence of the invention of 
games. Games do not grow on tendrils waiting for the hook, but are invented 
by thinking human subjects involved in a variety of activities instantiating a 
form of life (§§19, 23, 241; II pp. 174, 226). Problems about how games are 
invented, what it means to invent a game, and the invention of games by 
means of the establishment of rules, systematic and calculated, evolved, or of 
another description, are accordingly appropriately addressed by Wittgenstein 
as germane to his pragmatic theory of meaning in the later philosophy.  
Wittgenstein in the later as opposed to the early period believes that there 
can be no complete account of the conditions for meaningful expression in a 
of language without a searching investigation of where games including 
language games come from, and of what is or is not needed in order to 
institute the rules by which games are defined.        
 
2. Why Once Is Not Enough 
 
Wittgenstein considers the conditions for inventing a game in three main 
passages of Philosophical Investigations. He remarks, first: 
 
204. As things are I can, for example, invent a game that is never 
played by anyone. — But would the following be possible too:  
mankind has never played any games; once, however, someone 
invented a game — which no one ever played? 
 
When Wittgenstein says “as things are,” he refers to the extant culture in 
which games have a role in human social life. There exist games of different 
kinds, even leaving language games out of account for the moment as the 
principal focus of interest until we understand something more about the 
nature of games in general. This fact about how our form of life has been 
instantiated makes it possible for us to invent or to conceive of the inventing 
of a game that is never actually played.   
Presumably, the invention of a game that is never played is accomplished 
by applying our understanding of what is to count as a game. We possess 
such understanding by virtue of having participated in existent games, and 
we create a new game by devising a set of rules that had previously not been 
instituted or imagined. The rules are fixed, at least in the game inventor’s 
mind, but as it happens no one ever plays the game. Perhaps the world comes 
to an end just then, or, having invented the game by working out its rules, 
the game is not played because of lack of interest or other distractions. Such 
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a scenario Wittgenstein finds conceivable. We can project the possibility 
conservatively by beginning with a known game, such as chess, and then 
proposing a new set of rules for a game other than chess, in which, for 
example, the king is permitted to move three steps rather than just one step 
in any direction.   
The fictional putative “rules” are designed and checked, and may even be 
written down or in another way recorded, but we are to suppose that they are 
never actually implemented. They are never put into action in the actual 
playing of precisely this game as a variant of standard chess. Such an occur- 
rence is thinkable, Wittgenstein seems to believe, because the possibility of a 
new game that is never played supervenes on our understanding of the exis- 
tence of games that are constituted by different sets of rules that are actually 
followed when those games are actually played. It is only from the perspective 
and with the benefit of our social involvement in a culture of games that we 
can imagine game inventors in the circumstances Wittgenstein describes 
inventing a game that is never played when its rules are never followed.  
Significantly, for Wittgenstein’s understanding of the philosophical grammar 
of “game” and “rule,” an unplayed game is conceivable for us gamers as the 
devising a set of rules for a game, but only because we have the relevant 
concepts assimilated from our own game-related practices. We know what 
games are. We play games, and in the course of learning to play games and 
familiarizing ourselves with this family of activities, we also acquire, if we 
have not already done so from another context, the concept of what a rule is, 
as we learn how a rule is followed and how it is broken or violated in play- 
ing a game. Armed with this knowledge, it is then no heroic stretch for us to 
imagine a game inventor in a games-playing culture who cooks up a set of 
rules for a brand new game, which, as fate would have it, is never actually 
played.   
Wittgenstein rhetorically asks the philosophically more interesting question 
whether it would then be possible, if there had never been any games at any 
point in human history, in very different circumstances from those in which 
we find ourselves “as things are,” for someone to have invented the first and 
only game by formulating a set of rules for a game that is never actually 
played. Wittgenstein thinks there could be no such game, and we must 
wonder why in order to understand what Wittgenstein means by a game and 
by rule following in a game, including the language games that are the 
ultimate target of Wittgenstein’s inquiry.   
Why should we not be able to combine the two scenarios Wittgenstein 
describes? We know that games are invented, even if they are shaped-up out 
of other kinds of activities, such as practicing for the hunt. If we think back 
to the origin of games within human culture, then there must have been a 
first game, even if it only involved trying to throw stones in order to see who 
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of several participants can strike nearest to a fixed mark. If there are games 
as a historical fact about our species, then there must have been a first game.  
It would appear, if all games are constituted by rules designed in the service 
of a particular point and purpose, as Wittgenstein declares, then the first 
game must also have had such rules. We project an imaginary state of affairs 
involving only some of the real facts about the occasion on which the first 
game in our prehistory is about to be played. After the event occurs, we can 
probably agree with Wittgenstein that the first game upon actually being 
played has actually been invented. Wittgenstein wants to deny that the game 
was invented when an ancestor had the first bright idea for a rule that we in 
our culture today and as things are would recognize as a rule for a game.  
The question for criticism is whether or not Wittgenstein is right. For now we 
further combine the second major feature of Wittgenstein’s thought experiment, 
by supposing that just prior to the moment when the first game is about to be 
played for the first time something intervenes to prevent its happening. The 
world comes to an abrupt end, as previously proposed, or suddenly there are 
more pressing needs and no leisure opportunity for game-playing. So the 
whole idea of playing a game at least temporarily dies on the vine.   
The revised thought experiment appears just as intelligible as the one 
Wittgenstein describes under prevailing circumstances, “as things are.” Witt- 
genstein, however, must draw a sharp distinction between the two cases, 
denying that there could conceivably be a first game constituted by rules that 
is never actually played, when considered against a background in which 
games and game-playing by rule-following have not already evolved as part 
of any human form of life. We must nevertheless ask, given the close 
analogies between the two thought experiments, why for Wittgenstein it 
could not be the case that, just as the very first game was about to be played, 
circumstances intrude to prevent what would have been the first game with 
all its constitutive rules intact from actually being played?   
Wittgenstein might answer that, in the imagined circumstances where no 
game has ever been played, the concept of game as we know it can have no 
application. If the event in question would have been the first playing of a 
game, a playing of the first game, then the unexecuted idea for the game is 
not an idea for a game, even within the confines of the thought experiment 
assumptions, but only something ineluctably subjunctive that would have been 
an idea for a game, if only there had been such a thing as a game for the idea 
to intend. A game as an activity is a practice, and practice means that the 
activity has actually been engaged in. Otherwise it is only an idea or an 
intending of the activity, or of the rules for a rule-governed activity, which is 
not yet a practice. The philosophical grammar of the word “practice” assures 
that we can only be talking about an activity that, to speak redundantly, has 
actually been put into practice. We do not chop wood merely by intending to 
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do so, even if we must intend to chop wood in order to chop it as an action 
we at least try to perform. There can accordingly be no practice of chopping 
wood unless someone actually chops some. By analogy, there can be no 
practice of game-playing unless some games have actually been played. If 
games, including language games, as activities are practices, then the thought 
experiment in which the rules for a first unplayed language game is imagined 
or intended by a first language game inventor is unintelligible.     
The only way to break Wittgenstein’s chain of reasoning as interpretively 
reconstructed would then be to deny that games are activities, that activities 
are practices, or that practices as opposed to merely imagined or intended 
practices must have actually been engaged in, actually put into practice. If 
practices by definition are actually exemplified, as it seems right to say, even 
independently of Wittgenstein’s grasp of the philosophical grammar of these 
terms, if that part of Wittgenstein’s remarks does not invite criticism, then we 
could only object to the assumption that games are practices.   
Does Wittgenstein here fall victim to his own philosophical disease 
diagnosed in §593, a one-sided diet of examples? Could he be thinking only 
of actual games, and not of merely imagined or intended games? Why not 
say that actual games are actually played, generally more than once in order 
to satisfy the requirements of an actual practice, while virtual games are 
actually imagined or intended, but not actually played, in order to satisfy the 
requirements of a virtual practice? Again, Wittgenstein need only reply that 
he is interested in the family resemblance concept of game, rather than the 
concept of virtual game, in his efforts to understand the conditions for the 
meaningfulness of moves made in a wide variety of language games. Ad- 
ditionally, however, Wittgenstein argues that the phrase “virtual practice” 
blatantly violates the philosophical grammar of these two words by juxta- 
posing them incoherently. If a practice is merely virtual, it is not a practice.  
Wittgenstein does not consider a virtual practice to be a kind of practice, but 
something other than that, just as he might not consider fool’s gold to be a 
kind of gold. A practice, if we rightly interpret Wittgenstein’s perception of 
its philosophical grammar, is something that has actually been put into 
practice, just as an activity is something that has been activated. We reserve 
these kinds of words to mark precisely that tautology about this type of event, 
whereas we have another distinct and typically derivative vocabulary to refer 
in the abstract to something that may or may not actually be instantiated, as 
when we speak of a merely virtual activity or virtual practice, an idea for a 
merely imagined or intended activity or practice. 
The mistake Wittgenstein detects in thought experiments about an unplayed 
merely imagined or intended first game is in trying to extend our understand- 
ing of the relevant concepts to a situation in which the idea of inventing a 
game merely by thinking up a set of rules could not constitute even hypo- 
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thetical rules for a game. Wittgenstein must nevertheless grapple, as he does, 
with the scope and limits of intentionality in the invention of games. If 
intentionality alone were sufficient to invent a game, then it could also do so 
in the special case of language games. If intentionality alone were sufficient 
to invent the rules for a game, however, then it should be able to do so in 
every case, including the case of the first game. This is impossible in the case 
of the first game, Wittgenstein argues, which reflects back on the falsehood 
of the assumption that intentionality alone is sufficient to invent a game.  
For, grammatically, there are no games in the sense of extant practices at that 
hypothetical stage in the thought experiment’s imaginary human history for 
the first game inventor to intend.   
Intentionality, however, by reputation is supposed to be capable of linking 
thought to both existent and nonexistent objects. So, what difference can it 
make if Wittgenstein is right to insist that there are no games until some 
games are actually played, and that these games must even be played more 
than once in order to establish game-playing rule-following as an activity 
and practice, if a first invented game could be intended but never played? A 
critic might argue that this is how human invention generally works. At one 
time there were no motorcars but someone had the idea for such a vehicle 
and channeled the necessary materials, time and energy into making one.   
Such an argument appears at first to challenge Wittgenstein’s conclusion, 
but on reflection it merely constitutes more grist for Wittgenstein’s mill.   
Wittgenstein would also want to hold that if the inventor who first intended 
to make a motorcar before any motorcars actually existed or the entire cul- 
ture had perished that the motorcar would not have thereby been invented.  
The idea for a motorcar would have been invented, in a loose sense of the 
word, but a motorcar would not have been invented. Alternatively, Wittgenstein 
could reply that since there exist vehicles and there exist engines in the 
actual history of the motorcar’s development, so there is no violation of 
philosophical grammar in imagining that an inventor in a comparable thought 
experiment might intend to make a new kind of engine-powered vehicle that 
is never actually built. By analogy, the putative first game inventor in the 
thought experiment in which the game is never actually played has not 
invented the first game, but at most and in a similarly loose sense would only 
have invented the idea for a game.   
If this is a correct explanation, at least of what Wittgenstein might need or 
want to say about the problem, then, with reference to the imaginary context 
in which the example is supposed to occur, we cannot even truthfully say 
that such thoughts could occur. If the game inventor must intend that a 
certain set of rules provide the basis for a game, then the inventor must 
already know what kind of thing a game is or what kind of thing it would be, 
and this is precluded by the terms of the thought experiment itself, under 
 27 
which the very first game has yet to be played. Wittgenstein amplifies the 
thought experiment in this way: 
 
200. It is, of course, imaginable for two people belonging to a tribe 
unacquainted with games should sit at a chess-board and go through 
the moves of a game of chess; and even with all the appropriate 
mental accompaniments. And if we were to see it we should say 
they were playing chess. But now imagine a game of chess trans- 
lated according to certain rules into a series of actions which we do 
not ordinarily associate with a game — say into yells and stamping 
of feet. And now suppose those two people to yell and stamp instead 
of playing the form of chess that we are used to; and this in such a 
way that their procedure is translatable by suitable rules into a game 
of chess. Should we still be inclined to say they were playing a 
game? What right would one have to say so? 
 
We might nevertheless wonder if approximately the same kind of limitation 
plagues other types of intentions for inventions. Suppose there are as yet no 
stone axes, and an early hominid arrives at the idea of shaping a naturally 
occurring stone and attaching it to a wooden haft in order to make one, but is 
somehow prevented from acting. Shall we also conclude in such a case that 
the idea was not actually an idea for an axe, since there are as yet no axes?   
Doubts might be raised, because, although the putative axe inventor would 
not have the concept of an axe in anything like the way that we understand it, 
we might nevertheless reasonably suppose that the imagined inventor would 
still have had the idea of a stone attached to a stick that could be used to 
pound or cut. Arguably, that development might be close enough to our idea 
of a primitive axe to constitute the first hypothetically unrealized idea for or 
intention of making an axe, thwarted, as the thought experiment has it, before 
being put into practice. It seems accidental to the concept, after all, whether 
or not the idea is put into practice. And it is the concept of a game that 
Wittgenstein invokes in order to explain the conditions of meaningfulness for 
expression or effectiveness in many different kinds of language games.   
Thus, we return to a problem that we may otherwise have seemed to put 
to rest, given Wittgenstein’s larger project in Philosophical Investigations.  
Why we should not say the same about the thought experiment ancestor who 
thinks of a rule for an Ur-game that is also not actually brought to fruition by 
actually being played? Why is the projected event of having intended the 
rules for a first game that is never actually played, since we can intend both 
existent and nonexistent objects, since such an intending reflects possession 
of the relevant concept, and given that all Wittgenstein needs in order to 
explain the meaning of language use is the concept of a rule-governed game? 
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The answer has to do with the relation between games and their defining 
rules, and with Wittgenstein’s understanding of what it means to obey a rule 
as an aspect of the practical activities that constitute a form of life: 
 
199. Is what we call ‘obeying a rule’ something that it would be 
possible for only one man to do, and to do only once in his life? — 
This is of course a note on the grammar of the expression ‘to obey 
a rule.’ 
It is not possible that there should have been only one occasion 
on which someone obeyed a rule. It is not possible that there 
should have been only one occasion on which a report was made, 
an order given or understood, and so on. — To obey a rule, to make 
a report, to give an order, to play a game of chess, are customs 
(uses, institutions). 
To understand a sentence means to understand a language. To 
understand a language means to be master of a technique. 
 
Wittgenstein’s alter ego, the interlocutor, who may be legion, who frequently 
questions Wittgenstein’s temptations and inclinations to say one thing or 
another in the ongoing dialogue of remarks and counter-remarks in the text, 
poses a similar concern, focusing in the subsequent passage on one aspect of 
the real underlying subject of Wittgenstein’s inquiry. The suggestion is made 
that the power of intentionality overrides the facts of historical anthropology:           
 
205. “But it is just the queer thing about intention, about the mental 
process, that the existence of a custom, of a technique, is not 
necessary to it. That, for example, it is imaginable that two people 
should play chess in a world in which otherwise no games existed; 
and even that they should begin a game of chess — and then be 
interrupted.” 
But isn’t chess defined by its rules? And how are these rules 
present in the mind of the person who is intending to play chess? 
 
Looking ahead to the main direction of Wittgenstein’s later thought, and to 
the context in which these questions about the conceptual presuppositions of 
games, rules for games, and game-playing belong, it is clear that Wittgenstein 
must deny that intention is sufficient to explain semantic phenomena, and 
most fundamentally to explain the conditions under which it is possible for a 
given name to refer to a particular object.   
Do we achieve the designation of things by words simply by intending 
the word to represent the thing? Wittgenstein denies this most vigorously, 
and, again, we must struggle to follow his reasoning and understand why he 
should be unwilling to allow the intentionality of thought to serve as a prim- 
itive, conceptually irreducible explanation of the connection made between 
names and named objects at the foundations of meaningful expression in 
language. Returning to the case of games in general, it can only be intel- 
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ligible for someone outside any games playing culture to intend a set of rules 
for a first game, the innovator must be able to intend specifically to create a 
game. The objection from Wittgenstein seems to be that no one can have 
such an intention unless or until games as activities and game-playing as a 
practice are already on the scene. Wittgenstein in this suite of comments 
accordingly makes explicit at least a main part of the philosophical gram- 
matical connection between rule-following and the private language argument: 
 
202. And hence also ‘obeying a rule’ is a practice. And to think 
one is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule. Hence it is not possible 
to obey a rule ‘privately:’ otherwise thinking one was obeying a 
rule would be the same thing as obeying it. 
 
3. Pragmatic Origins of Games and Rules for Games 
 
How, then, does the first game get invented? We might compare the origin of 
games in Wittgenstein’s account with what Spinoza says about the origin of 
tools in his (1677) Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione (On the Improvement 
of the Understanding: Treatise on the Correction of the Understanding and 
on the Way in Which It May Be Directed Toward a True Knowledge of 
Things).   
Spinoza asks how the invention of tools can possibly get started, when it 
appears that one must already have a tool in order to make one. His prag- 
matic down-to-earth answer is that there have been naturally occurring tools, 
stone, bone, tree bark, grasses, branches of wood, and the like. These objects 
can be used just as they are for certain purposes, and then turned upon one 
another in order eventually to make more modern implements. Spinoza 
explains the problem and its commonsense solution: 
 
The matter stands on the same footing as the making of material 
tools, which might be argued about in a similar way [as the apparent 
circularity in efforts to gain knowledge]. For, in order to work 
iron, a hammer is needed, and the hammer cannot be forthcoming 
unless it has been made; but, in order to make it, there was need of 
another hammer and other tools, and so on to infinity. We might 
thus vainly endeavor to prove that men have no power of working 
iron. But as men at first made use of the instruments provided by 
nature to accomplish very easy pieces of workmanship, laboriously 
and imperfectly, and then, when these were finished, wrought other 
things more difficult with less labor and greater perfection; and so 
gradually mounted from the simplest operations to the making of 
tools, and from the making of tools to the making of more complex 
tools, and fresh feats of workmanship, till they arrived at making, 
with small expenditure of labor, the vast number of complicated 
mechanisms which they now possess.5   
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We find a stone, which after all in many places are literally thick on the 
ground, and through trial and error we work it with another stone into what 
experience teaches might be a desired shape. The process leading toward the 
creation of the most sophisticated kinds of tools is thereby underway with no 
magic required. The fact that we can often not point to a specific moment at 
which a first tool and the concept of a tool enters a culture, the exact event 
when a naturally occurring object along the continuum becomes a tool, or, by 
analogy, when a naturally occurring activity becomes a first invented game, 
only highlights the fact that games and rules for games, including language 
games, cannot be essentialistically defined, but are family-resemblance related, 
grading off imperceptibly from a background of originating activities that 
are only distantly related to the practice of game-playing.   
Invoking Spinoza in this connection is not farfetched, because we know 
that Wittgenstein read and was influenced by Spinoza in his early period.  
The impact is seen in the Tractatus 6.45 references to Spinoza’s concept of 
the world seen sub specie aeterni. A further conspicuous point of contact is 
Wittgenstein’s frequent mention of tools and using tools, of the different 
words in a language as like the different tools in a tool kit with different 
purposes. These examples may also relate to Wittgenstein’s engineering 
experience and perhaps to his practical efforts to communicate concepts to 
schoolchildren during the years between the Tractatus and The Blue and 
Brown Books. The point that Wittgenstein would probably want to emphasize 
is that the making of tools is a process that begins without intending as such 
to make a tool. The early hominid cannot intend to make a tool until natu- 
rally occurring objects that can be used as tools are incrementally modified 
for specific purposes and a cultural institution of tool making and using is set 
in place.   
What, then, if anything, do the first tool-makers intend? They may intend 
to shape a stone, or to use a stone or piece of wood to accomplish some 
purpose without thinking of it being a tool, and without intending to make a 
first tool, but rather as a natural rather than artifact utilizing activity, just as 
some birds use thorns to extract grubs from under tree bark presumably with 
no tool-related intentions. Or the first tool-makers and users might intend 
simply to crack open a coconut and pick up a stone to do the work, without 
intending that the stone thereby become anything in particular. We act ex- 
perimentally, so to speak, in many such instances. Only later do we understand 
what has worked and what has not worked, and as a consequence we are 
capable only afterward of intending to repeat a successful type of action in 
order to make or invent something new of like kind. We can intend to split 
apart a coconut, and we can intend to do so with a stone. The stone that we 
use for the job may thereby become the first de facto tool. Once we have 
things that we use regularly as tools, when we have acquired the concept of a 
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tool and are familiar with at least some of its instances, then we can also 
intend to repeat our successful actions by inventing and making more tools.  
If Wittgenstein is right, however, then we cannot intend to make a tool 
before there are any tools. For our intention could be about or directed toward 
no specific existent or nonexistent object, and there could be no answer to 
the question as to what we were intending that involved tools generally or a 
particular kind of tool as intended object. Since intending without intending 
any definite object is conceptually incoherent, we are confused if we believe 
that such intentions are conceivable.6 
Can we not rather say, then, that the inventor of the first game may have 
merely intended to pass the time in a structured way, that the structure for 
such a time-passing activity is what we now call a system of rules, and that 
such rules define what we now call a game? If Wittgenstein’s objection to 
the first merely intended invention of an unrealized game is not to amount to 
a mere lexical quibble, then there must still be something more fundamental 
underwriting his observation that it would not be possible for intending alone 
to create a first system of rules for a first game that is never actually played, 
and hence for a first language game. 
 
4. Philosophical Grammar in the Invention of Games 
 
Later in Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein provocatively writes: 
 
492. To invent a language could mean to invent an instrument for 
a particular purpose on the basis of the laws of nature (or con- 
sistently with them); but it also has the other sense, analogous to 
that in which we speak of the invention of a game. 
Here I am stating something about the grammar of the word ‘lan- 
guage,’ by connecting it with the grammar of the word ‘invent.’ 
 
Undoubtedly Wittgenstein is saying something about the grammar of the word 
“language,” and undoubtedly he is somehow connecting it to the grammar of 
the word “invent.” What, however, is he exactly saying? The problem of 
explaining the grammatical connections that Wittgenstein finds obvious, let 
alone tracing out his reasons for supposing that such grammatical linkages 
exist, is among the most rewarding interpretive problems presented by Witt- 
genstein’s difficult text.7   
We may easily find ourselves echoing Wittgenstein’s question borne of 
impatience and frustration at the problems of understanding these deeply 
interwoven relations within language, and the practical activities with which 
language games are integrated, when Wittgenstein demands, in §37 previously 
quoted: “What is the relation between name and thing named? — Well, what 
is it?” What indeed? The later Wittgenstein, in stark contrast to the semantic 
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transcendentalism of the Tractatus, seems to think that, since “everything 
lies open to view” and “what is hidden…is of no interest to us” (§126), we 
need only “look” at instances of naming and the teaching of names in order 
to “see” how names name things in specific correlation. The effort is never- 
theless no easier for Wittgenstein than it is for us in trying to understand the 
conclusions at which he finally arrives.8 
Wittgenstein does not like to take us by the hand from A to B, or even to 
C. Instead he pounces, leapfrogging over what he takes to be obvious fine 
points, from A to K. He does so perhaps because he already knows where he 
thinks he is going. We as readers, on the other hand, must then try to figure 
out how he thinks he gets there by piecing together the most likely or reason- 
able intervening steps. Wittgenstein says, perhaps tongue in cheek, in the 
Preface to Philosophical Investigations, vi: “I should not like my writing to 
spare other people the trouble of thinking.” Certainly the book on the whole 
has not done that. With so many things left open, with tantalizing danglers on 
every page, Wittgenstein’s remarks have been preordained to inspire multiple 
conflicting interpretations of his ideas, as has frequently occurred.   
An exercise for another occasion would be to line up and compare com- 
peting readings of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, about what he 
is trying to do in the book, of the aim and structure of the so-called private 
language argument, and all the other content of the text, to argue for some 
interpretations as more faithful to the writings than others. Instead, for the 
moment, we propose, develop and defend an interpretation of Wittgenstein’s 
Philosophical Investigations remarks on the invention of games that explains 
why, despite appearances, it is actually unintelligible, in the sense of being 
philosophically ungrammatical, to imagine that a game as we are to under- 
stand this kind of activity is not invented merely by intending a set of rules, 
and hence why intention alone is inadequate to explain the rules for language 
games whereby specific objects are named by particular names. 
A merely intended set of rules for a first game in a world where rule-
governed game playing does not exist and where no game has ever actually 
been played does not make sense for Wittgenstein, because it stands in 
violation of the word’s philosophical grammar. A game is something we do, 
an activity, rather than an idea for engaging in an activity or an abstract 
construction of rules for an activity. If I play a game, then I must intend to 
do so; but I do not play a game merely by intending to do so. Where 
language games are concerned in the naming of things and calling for them 
by their names or shopping for five red apples in the market, or the like, 
Wittgenstein emphasizes that the rules for naming and using other linguistic 
instruments from the tool box in corresponding language games cannot merely 
be intended, but must instead be part of an established practice. If mere 
intending were enough for the invention of an activity such as a game, 
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including any pragmatically explicable language game, then there would be 
a straightforward “spiritual” answer to the question of how it is that names 
and named objects get paired-up. We simply intend that this name refer to 
this object, and the work is done. This Wittgenstein staunchly denies. We 
have in part already seen why. But further, regardless of Wittgenstein’s own 
rationale, to whatever extent it might be recovered from his reflections, what 
good reasons can possibly support the conclusion that new games cannot be 
invented merely by intending a new system of game-defining rules? 
The previously missing step in this interpretation of Wittgenstein’s line of 
reasoning now explains why Wittgenstein should want to hold that games 
cannot simply be invented “in the head” by invoking the criteria for correct- 
ness that in similar application are supposed to disallow the possibility of a 
private sensation language. The explanation is complex, but we explode it 
into a series of distinct steps, as though in an argument, and we include brief 
discussion of what seems to be the exact motivation for Wittgenstein’s dis- 
cussion of the invention of games, as we understand it, to fit the interpretation 
being advanced.  
(1) Wittgenstein introduces the topic of the invention of games in order to 
refute the “spiritual” (geistlicher) suggestion that the naming of objects can 
be accomplished psychologically by inner rather than external behavioral 
ostension, as a first move in a language game undertaken entirely by intention 
or intentionality, merely by intending that a certain name should name a 
certain object. 
(2) Wittgenstein maintains, as a principle of philosophical grammar with 
immediate implications for philosophical anthropology, that the invention of 
a very first game (of any kind, language games included and of particular 
interest) could not be accomplished entirely by intention or intentionality, 
merely intending that a certain rule should be followed.   
(3) Criteria of correctness are needed to name objects, as illustrated by 
Wittgenstein’s invoking their absence in “going through the motions” of 
trying to name an individual sensation as S in a private sensation diary.  
Satisfying criteria of correctness in this sense means being able in principle 
to ascertain that the same object designated by the same name is encountered 
on multiple occasions. This, Wittgenstein maintains, cannot be done in the 
case of putative private sensations like recurring pains at different times and 
places. We cannot answer the question whether a pain in the right forefinger 
experienced yesterday is the same individual object, identically the same 
pain, or a different numerically distinct pain albeit with phenomenologically 
indistinguishable properties from yesterday’s sensation, or even the same 
pain that has moved from one place in the subject’s body to another, and so 
we cannot name private mental events in the way that we can name a child, a 
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dog, a goldfish, building, cruise ship, or the like, for which the use of names 
has a pragmatic point and purpose.   
(4) Wittgenstein offers this restriction on naming as part of the philo- 
sophical grammar of naming. To name something is to establish a one-one 
relation between a name and an object, and, in the case of private mental 
events such as pains purport to be, we cannot even in principle determine 
whether or not we have access to the same mental event from one occasion 
to the next. Since we cannot name them, private mental events, including acts 
of intending, equally cannot serve as naming relations, as mental psycho- 
logical names or namings or intendings to name that can connect the private 
mental event of intending in the act of naming to a specific object. The object 
outside of thought, the child or hamster or goldfish that we propose to name, 
cannot be named Augustine-fashion by pointing at the object and uttering its 
name, because of the referential underdetermination of pure behavior ostension.  
Something more is required. Nor can the object be named merely by intend- 
ing that the name should refer to precisely this object, however the object is 
practically individuated.   
(5) The instructive reason seems to be that pure intending or a pure act of 
intention as a private mental event is itself incapable even in principle of 
being practically individuated as a single nameable thing, as we learn from 
the private language argument which precedes the discussion of inventing 
games in Wittgenstein’s text, and the unavailability of criteria of correctness 
for the naming of private sensations such as purported pain sensation S as an 
individual nameable object. If the pure intending or pure act of intention 
were not private, then we should have to handle it as §36 carves things up in 
roughly Cartesian style, as a bodily or körperliche rather than spiritual or 
geistliche answer to the riddle of how names name. Wittgenstein’s distinction 
is thus construed as a variation on the deep and perennial philosophical divide 
between externalism and internalism in the philosophy of mind reflected 
immediately in the only viable philosophical semantics. 
(6) If private mental events, including pure intendings or pure internal 
acts of intention considered in isolation from any accompanying external 
actions, are not capable even in principle of being practically individuated, 
then they cannot serve as they would need to do if intention were sufficient 
in and of itself to invent a first game. If pure intention is inadequate to invent 
a first game, then it is inadequate to explain the origin of games in general, 
including those most basic language games in which objects are named. To 
conceive of such a possibility, we would need to correlate a particular 
imagined act of intending a particular rule for a first unplayed game with the 
unplayed game itself, and this we cannot do if we lack identity conditions for 
particular intendings in the form of criteria of correctness. 
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(7) Not only are there no individual instances of unfollowed and unbroken 
or unviolated rules for a first ever unplayed game to be invoked, but equally 
there are no acts of intention, construed as private mental events and as such 
incapable of being named as individuals, by which the rules for an unfol- 
lowed and unbroken or unviolated set of rules for a first ever unplayed game.  
We would need to correlate such particular intendings with particular unin- 
stantiated rules, satisfying criteria of correctness to provide identity conditions 
on both sides, in order to make sense of such a hypothesis. Wittgenstein 
concludes on the contrary that outside of our actual cultural development, in 
the rarefied extra-pragmatic extra-practical-activity atmosphere in which the 
geistliche intentional solution is imagined to take place, we lack any such 
identity criteria for particular intendings or acts of intention. If the imagined 
act of intending cannot be named because it does not satisfy Wittgenstein’s 
grammatical criteria of correctness requirement, then no such correlation is 
conceivable, because there is no individually nameable psychological event 
to be correlated with what we may otherwise want to think of as the first 
unplayed game. 
(8) Hence, games generally are not invented purely by intending a cor- 
responding new system of rules. They must be rules for a game, and if 
games are practices, then the very fact that everything comes unglued if the 
game is never actually played is testimony to Wittgenstein’s conclusion that 
intention alone is never sufficient to invent a game, or, therefore, to name an 
object by an intentional act of inner ostension. We cannot understand the 
naming relation purely as a correlation between name and named object, if 
the correlation is supposed to be accomplished entirely in the abstract in each 
case by a particular intention or intending act.  
 
5. Rules for Games in a Form of Life 
 
The Augustinian “bodily” or körperliche account of naming is roundly 
defeated by the referential underdetermination of pure behavioral ostension.  
The (Brentanian? Husserlian?) “spiritual” or geistliche solution is equally 
defeated via the private language argument by undermining the essential 
particularity requirement for correlating the intention to use a particular 
name to refer to a specific object as mediating between the named object and 
its name.   
When both body and spirit are exhausted, we have no “pure” possibilities 
remaining, neither pure behavioral ostension nor pure intending. Philosophical 
semantics, as informal and unsystematic as it appears in Wittgenstein’s later 
writings, must combine movement and intention in a concept of action 
pragmatically understood, in which language use is one among many tools 
for accomplishing a wide variety of purposes, in language games with rules 
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whose point and purpose are fixed by practical circumstantial needs, and 
with its own distinctive natural history.   
If we (speech) act, then in some sense we must intend to verbally behave.  
We decide, however automatically much of the mechanism functions, to move 
our vocal cords, tongue, lips, etc. But we do not (speech) act merely by 
intending to do these things. Thus, we cannot adequately explain the relation 
between a name and the object it names by referring exclusively either to our 
bodily movements or to our private intendings in the intentionality of our 
thoughts as we name something or think about or try to teach its name to 
another language user. If the purity of the body and spirit approaches fail, 
then we must get dirty instead in the actual world of what it is we do and try 
to do with language as a powerful tool.   
We must look instead to the impure mixture of body and spirit in the 
actions by which we communicate, beginning with the acts of naming that 
Wittgenstein compares to the setting out of pieces on a chess board as some- 
thing we do first as a preparation for play. When we understand why neither 
pure behavioral ostension nor pure intentionality can adequately explain the 
naming of objects as the most fundamental first step in engaging in even the 
most primitive of our pragmatically rooted language games, then we may 
come to appreciate that another kind of explanation for rule-governed game-
playing generally and language game-playing in particular is required. Witt- 
genstein sketches the landscapes afforded by such actual language games as 
though in a travel notebook, voyeuristically encountering what it is that people 
do when they engage in linguistic exchange. He reflects finally on the 
implications of pragmatically grounded activities for the nonexistence of 
philosophical language games, of philosophy as a meaningful practice, 
previously declared in Tractatus 4.111 on very different grounds as standing 
“above or below, but not beside the natural sciences.” From a very different 
perspective than that afforded by the early philosophy, Wittgenstein in the 
later writings is thereby positioned to pronounce all putative philosophical 
concepts, questions, answers, principles, and propositions, as meaningless, 
deeply and often almost inscrutably in violation of the pragmatically origi- 
nating and justifying philosophical grammar of terms and phrases in the 
toolkits of genuine language games.9 
 
NOTES 
 
1. Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Blue and Brown Books: Preliminary Studies for the 
“Philosophical Investigations”, edited by Rush Rhees, 2nd edition (New York:  
Harper & Row, Publishers, 1960), p. 1. 
2. Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, edited by C.K. Ogden (London:  
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1922), 5.526 (all parenthetical references to and trans- 
lation from this edition). 
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3. On ineffability in the Tractatus, see, among numerous other recommended 
sources, P.M.S. Hacker, “When the Whistling Had to Stop,” in Wittgensteinian 
Themes: Essays in Honour of David Pears, edited by David Charles and William 
Child (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 13–48. A.W. Moore and Peter 
Sullivan, “Ineffability and Nonsense,” Supplement to the Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society, 77, 2003, pp. 169–193 (Part I, Moore); pp. 195–223 (Part II, 
Sullivan). All the literature surrounding the work of the “New Wittgensteinians,” 
efforts to deploy the saying-showing distinction to make sense of the semantic role 
of aspects of meaning conventionally understood that are excluded by Wittgenstein’s 
general form of proposition, and the controversies involving “resolute” versus 
“irresolute” readings especially Tractatus 6.54 and 7 in context are relevant to the 
interpretation of Wittgenstein’s text as involving the ineffability of at least some of 
what Wittgenstein declares to be literal nonsense, including all the sentences of the 
Tractatus itself. 
4. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 3rd edition, translated by G.E.M. 
Anscombe, edited by Anscombe and Rhees (New York: Macmillan Publishing, 
1968) (all parenthetical references to and translations from this edition). 
5. Benedict de Spinoza, On the Improvement of the Understanding in Spinoza, 
Ethics, Preceded by On the Improvement of the Understanding, translated and edited 
with an introduction by James Gutmann and interpretive essay by Frederick J.E. 
Woodbridge (New York:  Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1949), p. 11. 
6. It is sometimes said that intentional states need not be directed toward a 
specific object, as in cases where we fear something, but nothing in particular. The 
general case is made for intentionality as the direction of thought upon a specific 
object if we include as intended objects such states of affairs as “That something 
unwanted might occur.” This object is unambiguous enough to make the argument 
for the specificity of intention, without in this application supposing that the intend- 
ing subject necessarily knows what specific unwanted occurrence might transpire. It 
is a distinct intended object, in the sense that it is phenomenologically different from 
other general objects of thought, such as the state of affairs as “That something 
pleasant or satisfying might occur.” Specificity at such a level of intended states of 
affairs is all that the present argument requires. 
7. Wittgenstein further argues against the adequacy of Augustinian pure behavioral 
ostension as a method of naming and communicating the meanings of names, in a 
section of text that is not often discussed. He maintains in §28: “Now one can 
ostensively define a proper name, the name of a colour, the name of a material, the 
name of a point of the compass and so on. The definition of the number two, ‘That is 
called ‘two’’ — pointing to two nuts — is perfectly exact. — But how can two be 
defined like that? The person one gives the definition to doesn’t know what one 
wants to call ‘two’; he will suppose that ‘two’ is the name given to this group of 
nuts! — He may suppose this; but perhaps he does not. He might make the opposite 
mistake; when I want to assign a name to this group of nuts, he might understand it 
as a numeral. And he might equally well take the name of a person, of which I give 
an ostensive definition, as that of a colour, of a race, or even of a point of the 
compass. That is to say: an ostensive definition can be variously interpreted in every 
case.” If there are such individual entities as numbers that we can name but not point 
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to, then pure behavioral ostension will obviously not serve to explain all naming, 
teaching and designations of names. Wittgenstein does not pursue the argument in 
any depth, perhaps because of perennial realism-nominalism controversies and the 
questionable ontic status of abstract entities. See also §§29–35. In §33, Wittgenstein 
observes: “— And what does ‘pointing to the shape,’ ‘pointing to the colour’ consist 
in? Point to a piece of paper. — And now point to its shape — now to its colour — 
now to its number (that sounds queer). — How did you do it? —.” 
8. Wittgenstein suggests in several places that pretheoretical observation of 
language game-playing ought to be sufficient to reveal the workings of language 
generally and naming in particular. He writes in §66 that we should not assume that 
all games have something in common, but rather “look and see whether there is 
anything common to all.” In §654, Wittgenstein writes: “Our mistake is to look for 
an explanation where we ought to look at what happens as a ‘proto-phenomenon’.  
That is, where we ought to have said: this language-game is played.” See also 
§§144, 340. 
9. I am grateful to an anonymous journal referee for useful comments and sug- 
gestions leading to an improved version of this essay. I thank my recent Wittgenstein 
seminar students at Bern in Spring semester 2014, for providing a sounding board 
and offering their reflections on this aspect of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. 
 
